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Abstract— Development of intelligent systems in particular 
Water Distribution Systems (WDS) increases the demand of 
implementing a secure scheme that can preserve user’s 
identification and data consumption through maintaining 
confidentiality, authentication and integrity. Decentralization 
topology has investigated a lot recently in the literature with the 
development of bitcoins and Ethereum networks in different IoT 
disciplines such as power systems and healthcare systems. In 
this paper, feasibility and uses cases studies on the integration 
WDS with Blockchain Technology are discussed. Moreover, the 
customer’s data and identity anonymity techniques that can 
be integrated with the network are discussed. Furthermore, a 
data aggregation mechanism of the smart meters in Water 
Distribution System (WDS) based on distributed ledger and 
Blockchain technologies is proposed. Further, the customer’s 
identity using bloom filter is simulated and optimal 
parameters of the bloom filter are suggested. 
Keywords-Water Distribution System; Smart Water 
Network; Blockchain, Secure Scheme 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Water networks are one of the critical infrastructure’s 
essentials for human life and health since they can affect 
the safety and health well-being of the citizen, the fact is 
that they can be endangered, disrupted by physical or cyber 
threats. Therefore, it is important to continuously monitor 
and control these networks to minimize the potential of 
attacks either on operational technology (OT) or 
information technology (IT). Also, it ensures a quality, 
efficient, robust, and reliable process of the whole network. 
This can be conducted by implementing a Smart Water 
Network (SWN) along with a secure scheme that can stand 
against cyber-attacks.  
Water utility services oversee the sensitive personal 
information of the users’ and employees’ records as well as 
their payments information. There are several examples of 
cyber-attacks in the water sector such as; the ransom-ware 
attack in the city of Atlanta in March 2018 where the 
watershed management employees were unable to log in 
the system for two weeks and the utility had to take the 
servers down for months with an estimated $5 million in 
recovery efforts [1]. Cybercriminals have accessed 
customer data through the online payment system where 
the attackers have got the administrator credentials [2]. 
Also, they have gained access to valves and flow operations 
according to the American Water Works Association 
(AWWA) [3]. A 2018 study [4] showed that for every sixty 
seconds the cyber-crime costs more than $1.1 million and 
impacts more than 1,800 people. Water sectors are warned 
by the U.S. government of similar attacks that occurred led 
to shutting down Ukraine’s power grid in Dec-ember 2015 
[5]. American National Standards Institute (ANSI) 
American Water Works Association (AWWA) have 
released several standards in security Practices for 
Operation & Management [6], Risk & Resilience 
Management of Water & Wastewater Systems [7], and 
Emergency Preparedness Practices [8]. The water sector in 
the United Kingdom (U.K.) has only witnessed one cyber-
attack in 2017 on National Health Service (NHS) where 
hackers managed to shut down hundreds of computers in 
health service demanding a ransom payment. This attack 
caused the cancellation of more than 19,000 appointments 
with an estimation loss of £92 million [9].  Also, with the 
development of SWN devices in the internet of things (IoT) 
environment will open more avenues for hackers as it 
happened in Ukraine in the power grid system.  
Moreover, according to [10], 70% of the world’s power, 
water, and other critical infrastructure utilities reported a 
cyber-attack within one year, while 78% of these attacks 
are expected to be succeeded breaching in the next two 
years. Moreover, the water crises have been ranked as the 
fifth of the top risks in terms of impact according to the 
World Economic Forum Global Risks Perception Survey 
2018 [11]. Water crises have more than average impact and 
the more average likelihood or global risks. Located 
Furthermore, the number of reported cybersecurity in the 
water domain has been increasing in the last couple of 
years. According to Schneider Electric [12], 4% and still 
increasing of the reported cyber-attacks incidents are in the 
water domain in the United States (U.S.) in 2017.  Further, 
according to [13] the attacking events, in general, are 
increasing rapidly from 2017 to 2018 where it can reach 
130 events in a month instead of 80. 
High-security level, is established by working of the OT 
such as; SCADA, PLC, Pumps etc… and IT such as 
processing platforms, etc…. A global survey in 2012 which 
is released by Sensus [14] showed data from SWNs that 
using similar networks can save utilities up to $12.5 billion 
per year and it will help to ensure a balance between the 
supply and demand. Estimated of $9.6 billion each year is 
the amount of water leakage stated in the Sensus survey 
[14]. Furthermore, it is expected that two-thirds of the 
world population or 4.6 billion people will suffer from 
stressed conditions of water resources.  
Recently, literature has been discussing integrating 
distributed ledger and smart contracts in Blockchain 
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technology with IoT devices in smart homes [15, 16], smart 
cities [17], healthcare [18, 19], and power grid systems 
[20]–[22]. Integrating Blockchain with Water networks is 
not investigated in the literature. The work in this paper is 
inspired by the work in [22]. 
The main contribution of this paper is to explore the 
feasibility and uses cases studies on integrating Blockchain 
technology with smart water networks. Moreover, the 
customer’s data and identity anonymity techniques that can 
be integrated with the network are discussed. Furthermore, 
a data aggregation mechanism of the smart meters in Water 
Distribution System (WDS) based on distributed ledger and 
Blockchain technologies is proposed. Further, customer’s 
identity using bloom filter is simulated and optimal 
parameters of the bloom filter is suggested.  
This paper is organized as follows: Section II explores 
the feasibility and uses cases on integrating Blockchain in 
Smart Water Networks (SWNs). Section III reviews 
customer identity and data anonymity existing techniques 
that can be implemented in the data aggregation and 
Blockchain. Section IV, proposes Data aggregation 
mechanism in details. Section V simulates the customer’s 
identity performance. Section VI concludes the work and 
state the future work. 
II. BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY IN SMART WATER 
NETWORKS 
Blockchain enables peer-to-peer (PTP) transaction in a 
decentralized network (without intermediates) and all the 
transaction is conducted in an immutable distributed ledger. 
Ethereum (Blockchain 2.0) uses the account-based 
transaction model instead of the unspent transaction output 
(UTXO) that has been used in Bitcoin. Blockchain 
technology is based on four aspects; first, consensus, which 
provides the proof of work (PoW) or proof of stack (PoS) 
that verifies the action in the network, second, ledger, 
affords the complete details of the transaction within 
networks in an immutable way [23]. Third, cryptography, 
this maintains that all data in the ledger and network, in 
general, are encrypted, and fourth smart contract which is 
used to verify and validate the participants of the network 
[23]. The Conesus is used to be conducted in PoW where 
users are competing to verify the data to get a minor reward, 
but this has two disadvantages which are two much energy 
consumption and centralization. Whenever one of the users 
verify the process fast it will be included in a mining pool 
which means the verification will always occur from that 
pool which transforms the decentralization into 
centralisation. PoS is suggested in 2011 where only one or 
few users which are selected based on certain criteria that 
can validate the work.  
There are two types of the Blockchain network can be used; 
public and private (permissioned). Public Blockchain 
which can be accessed by anyone in the network. It is still 
not ready to support scalability as it is considered as time 
and energy consuming. Private Blockchain requires certain 
permissions to read and create a new block of the 
information which can limit the parties that can transact. It 
can facilitate scalability and privacy for the network along 
with it has been using with smart devices. For the private 
blockchains that has permissions on a specific consortium 
is called Consortium blockchain.   
Blockchain can be integrated with Water Networks in 
four applications;  
1. Track the consumption data from smart meters at 
customer’s households to prevent duplication with 
any other malicious data.  
2. Track the data from the hydraulic sensors (i.e., 
pressure measurements of pipelines) to prevent 
data tampering of the measurements.  
3. Facilitate a secure transfer of data across different 
sectors and stakeholders.  
4. Track water quality and quantity data 
measurements with customers to provide 
transparency of the operational process.  
Permissioned or consortium blockchains are good 
candidates for first three applications where Conesus aspect 
may not be applied which can relax the processing of the 
data or permissible with consensus can be used to establish 
high degree of security where not only certain customers 
can send data but also the data transmitted has to be 
validated which can limit from data tampering of smart 
meters attack. Public and permissioned blockchains can be 
used together for the fourth application where all customers 
can access the quality and quantity of the water on a real-
time basis but they cannot send data and the operation of 
transmission of the measurements is conducted by only 
permissioned devices.   
Integrating blockchain to the discussed applications can 
contribute towards many security and trust challenges 
which are: prevent duplication of water consumption, 
provide high-security level of identification and 
authentication for sensing nodes, seamless secure data 
transfer and avoid data loss from data tampering, high 
integrity of data, reduce the inefficiencies of the bottleneck 
problem since there is no intermediary, and provide history 
of connected devices which can be tracked for 
troubleshooting purposes. However, these advantages can 
make a significant impact on Water Distribution System 
(WDS), but there are some limitation and challenges need 
to be considered which are: excessive energy, huge 
computing operations, mining nodes which validates the 
operations should be selected carefully and scalability of 
the network increases the complexity. Besides, these 
limitations, the Smart Water Networks (SWNs) are needed 
to be upgraded as most of the networks in the industry are 
based on centralisation manner and the sensing devices 
including smart meters may not be able to do the 
computations. Also, some hydraulic sensors underground 
may not have enough energy for the consensus. Further, 
there is no universal standard for the communications 
protocol of the data in where yet some of the common 
communications protocols can be used.  
It is important to mention that the Conesus algorithm 
should be different than the typical Algorithms due to the 
nature of the data used in the blockchain, in a matter of 
consensus, the average consumption or pressure can be 
used to verify the data yet this section requires further 
investigation in the future work.  
III. SURVEY OF CUSTOMER IDENTITY AND DATA 
ANNYMOITY TECHNIQUES 
There are some techniques that can be integrated with 
blockchain for tracking the smart meters consumption data 
to maintain the anonymity of customer’s data and identity 
along with the blockchain operational procedures. 
 
A. Protecting user identity  
There are three main techniques that have been 
discussed in the literature that can be used in SWN to 
protect user identity [24]. These three techniques are 
virtual ring [25], anonymisation [26, 27] and pseudonym 
[28]. In Virtual ring approach, the authentication process 
has to be approved from the server via a virtual ring as 
the users send their messages. The server validates their 
identity using the ring signature without knowing the 
user’s identity [24]. On the other hand, it is difficult to 
find a malicious user in case one of the users sent a 
falsified message.   
Anonymisation is discussed technique in the literature 
in preserving user identity [26, 27]. User’s credit can be 
classified into identity information, quasi-identifier (age 
and gender) and sensitive information. User’s credits can 
be accessed if they have not been anonymized. A 
Pseudonym is a different name that is assumed instead of 
the real identity during authentication and bloom filter is 
usually used in order to match these Pseudonyms with 
the groups in the database.  
In this paper, blockchain is adapted to provide 
decentralization to avoid such data tampering. A 
pseudonym is also a well-known technique that protects 
the user’s identity.  This method requires signature and 
zero knowledge proof. A preserving-privacy scheme is 
proposed in [29] for the smart grid that adopts discrete 
logarithm to hide the user’s identity using signature.  
B. Protecting user data 
There are three main techniques that have been discussed 
in the literature that can be used in SWN to protect user data 
[24]. These three techniques are household battery [30, 31], 
data aggregation [32, 33] and credential-based technique 
[34]-[36]. Household battery scheme is used to hide real-
time data when consumption goes high whereas battery 
discharges. Thus, privacy can be protected along with 
balancing consumption. But this may conflict with the 
user’s economic interest. Data aggregation involves 
homomorphic encryption and data obfuscation whereas it 
enables intermediaries to operate on the data without 
information of plaintext. Two homomorphic encryption 
methods are often used namely; Paillier encryption and 
BGN encryption. The obfuscation data is maintained by 
adding noise into original data. Credential-based is based 
on blind signature using public key cryptography whereas 
the user’s credentials are approved via control center 
blindly.  
 
Figure 1.  The proposed Network Model. 
 
IV. DATA AGGREGATION MECHANISM  
A. Proposed Network Model  
The proposed network model consisted of multi-tier 
network of district area network (DMA) and Wide Area 
network (WAN) (see Figure 1). Each residential area is 
covered by DMA for several miles that contain several 
Smart Meters (SMs) whereas SMs is installed at each 
households to report real-time water consumption to the 
utility via DMA. Each subscriber’s house is equipped by 
SM to report the consumption to the utility via local 
collector called DMA. Each DMA covers L number of 
zones where each zone contains number of SMs.  
All SMs in a certain zone are connected in distributed 
topology and only one of the SM which are chosen who 
send all the blocks/packets to the DMA gateway. The data 
is transmitted from SM to the utility using wireless 
communications (GSM/GPRS technology). On the other 
hand, DMA gateways can communicate with the cloud 
using wired or long-distance -communications. The cloud 
with the communication of the data analysis center can 
draw the consumption profile of each household in near 
real-time data. 
When a new SM is created, it first requests the list of 
trusted nodes (SMs) from root servers which are the central 
name-servers that is accessed when a user request an 
information. To ensure integrity and confidentiality, each 
SM needs to be authenticated with the network (nodes list) 
to ensure that only legitimate devices are added to the 
blockchain network. Moreover, every authenticated and 
encryption process should be done efficiently. This can 
occur based upon:  
•  Installed Credentials on SM during setup: There 
must be a secure procedure in implementing 
blockchain that could generate these credentials. 
• Credentials that can be given by the SM owner: 
the enrolment process of SM into a server is 
initialized by the user. 
B. Proposed Data Aggregation Mechanism integrated 
with blockchain  
The proposed data aggregation mechanism at a certain 
mining node consisted of six steps: receiving SM data with 
customer’s signature, hash functions, chain block 
verification, data aggregation, utilities and generating 
consumption plan, bill and dynamic pricing (see Figure 2).  
 
1. Encryption, Hash function and Customer’s digital 
signature  
SMs use the public key of the sender (kSender, public=p x q) 
to send encrypted consumption data, which is then stored 
in one of the blocks in the blockchain network. Receiver 
key is then requested by the sender from the ledger for 
encrypting the consumption. This method will ensure that 
the only receiver will be able to decrypt the sent 
consumption data using their private key [23, 37]. When 
the data is encrypted by a private key, the digital signature 
is generated by the blockchain which is used to verify the 
source and authenticity of the data. 
A digital signature is a string of text that is extracted from 
the data and the private key. Thus, it cannot be used for any 
other process. If the data is changed the digital signature 
will change. This minimizes the potential attackers that aim 
to alter the amount of consumption [38]. All the sent data 
have digital signatures. The procedures of the digital 
signature are described below [38]:  
• The hash of the data is calculated by the sender 
and then encrypted with the private key. The 
digital signature is generated based on the data and 
the public key.  
• The digital signature is decrypted using the public 
key to obtain the hash of the data. 
• The resulted hash is compared with the protected 
hash and it is only valid if they are same. If the 
digital signature of each sent data is stored into the 
ledger, the trust of the nodes improves. 
 
2. Verification of chain block 
After-mentioned the survey of the data and identity 
anonymity techniques, bloom filter and zero-knowledge 
proof are good candidates for the data verification of the 
blockchain. Bloom filter matches that the pseudonyms 
database of customer’s identity with the data in the block 
and zero-knowledge proof verifies the data consumption 
without knowing the identity. This verification is 
conducted by the chosen node which is picked based on the 
average water consumption and is referred to as mining 
node.  
A Zero-knowledge proof is conducted by making each 
block answer a complex mathematical problem created 
using an irreversible cryptographic hash function. In order 
to solve this mathematical problem, the block has to assign 
a random number that combined with the previous block - 
 
Figure 2.  The proposed Data Aggregation Mechanism at the mining 
node. 
content. It may take a year for a typical computer to answer 
this problem without knowing the previous block content. 
However, a block is usually solving it in 10 minutes as there 
is a larger number of computers in the chain. This privilege 
the node that solved the mathematical problem to place the 
next block on the chain.  
 
3. Dispatching, Billing, consumption plan and 
Dynamic pricing 
After receiving the summation of water consumption 
from each blockchain in different districts via DMA. The 
data management and analysis center draw the 
consumption profile and pattern with respect to the zone. 
The consumption bill can be calculated and generated at the 
billing center regarding the dynamic pricing of water tariff 
about the demands as follows: 
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠
= � � 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷_𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝_𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑁𝑁𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑠𝑠
𝑖𝑖=1
 
 
(1) 
where 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  and 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖are the water consumption and time 
period tariff ladder at day i and time interval j. given that 
there is a three-time period of tariffs in each day.  
The financial department in the utility can then calculate 
the consumption of each customer based on the data in the 
blockchain blocks in each zone when the billing data 
comes. A pseudonym is used to hide the real identity of the 
customers at the same chain. Timely mannered Pseudonym 
generator block is introduced at each SM where each user 
randomly changes his water consumption profile with 
different Pseudonyms. The data to be transmitted can be 
written as 𝐷𝐷𝑠𝑠 (𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 ,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 ,𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖), where 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 ,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖  and 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖  are 
the user’s reporting of 𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 , Timestamp and  Pseudonym 
name which is encrypted by a private key (𝑘𝑘). 
The consumption plan and Dynamic can be changed 
based on the quantity of water and consumption patterns in 
terms of districts. The current water networks that have 
smart meters are using a fixed water tariff yet there are 
many publications study the advantages of implementing 
dynamic pricing scheme [40].  
V. SIMULATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The simulation of the proposed data aggregation 
mechanism focused on the Bloom filter part in contributing 
to the anonymisation of user identity in a SWN using smart 
contracts and distributed ledgers in blockchain technology. 
It is evaluated using the probability of false positive where 
it can recognize one of the pseudonyms which do not exist. 
On the other hand, it is guaranteed to have no probability 
of false negative where it cannot match one of the 
pseudonyms with an actual existence in the database. The 
data aggregation mechanism of customer’s identity using 
Bloom filter is simulated with various numbers of users at 
each DMA. Considering that smart meters can transmit the 
measurements with maximum of 500 meters as it has been 
used in the second generation of smart meters (SMETS2) 
[38]. Hence, we assumed that each DMA will be in charge 
of communicating with up to 200 smart meters which can 
represent 25 building with 8 flats at each building.  
The impact of the number of users at each DMA on the 
Probability of False Positive is increasing from the 0 to 0.24 
at 1 to 460 (see Figure 3). Since the number of users in the 
filter increases, the probability of false positive occurring 
increases as well.  
Moreover, the effect of the number of hash function 
decreasing the false positive at the end till reaches the 
optimal value of the number of the hash function which is 
around 7 (see Figure 4). Furthermore, it decreases suddenly 
at 230 bits in the bloom filter and almost saturates till 1200 
bits (see Figure 5). The time complexity is considered with 
the given system parameters, the time complexity is 
evaluated using O(K) and it is equal 2000. This is much less 
than other techniques. 
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
This paper explores the feasibility and uses cases studies 
on integrating Blockchain technology with smart water 
networks. Moreover, the customer’s data and identity 
anonymity techniques that can be integrated with the 
network are discussed. Furthermore, a data aggregation 
mechanism of the smart meters in Water Distribution 
System (WDS) based on distributed ledger and Blockchain 
technologies is proposed. Further, customer’s identity 
using bloom filter is simulated and optimal parameters of 
the bloom filter is suggested (7 hash functions, 2000 
number of bits of bloom filter for 200 customers at certain 
DMA). 
Integrating Blockchain to the discussed applications can 
contribute towards many security and trust challenges 
which are: prevent duplication of hydraulic and water 
consumption, provide high sensing nodes identification and 
authentication, seamless secure data transfer and avoid data 
loss from data tampering, high integrity of data, reduce the 
inefficiencies of the bottleneck problem since there is no 
intermediary, and provide history of connected device 
which can be tracked for troubleshooting purposes. 
However, these advantages can make a significant impact 
on Water distribution, but there are some limitation and 
challenges need to be considered which are: excessive - 
  
Figure 3.  Probability of false positive and number of users at each DMA 
 
Figure 4.  Probability of false positive and number of hash function 
 
Figure 5.  Probability of false positive and number of bits in the bloom  
energy, huge computing operations, mining nodes should 
be selected carefully and scalability of the network 
increases the complexity. Besides, these limitations, the 
Smart Water Networks (SWNs) needed to be upgraded as 
most of the networks in the industry are based on 
centralisation manner and the sensing devices including 
smart meters may not be able to do the computations. Also, 
some hydraulic sensors underground may not have enough 
energy for the consensus. Further, there is no universal 
standard for the communications protocol of the data yet 
some of the common communications protocols can be 
used.  
This work can be extended by consider Blockchain 
verification block and implement it using one of the open 
source platforms. Moreover, integrating it Smart Water 
Networks (SWNs) to track the hydraulic sensors data inside 
and outside water plant. Furthermore, implementing it with 
water quantity and quality sensors to maintain transparency 
of the operational process.  Further, the Conesus algorithms 
need further investigation because of the nature of the 
measurement data.  
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